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Abstract
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen
and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience.
The chooser may be “tricked” into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We
investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is
diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is
the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience
is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between
quality and salience.
Choice requires attention to what options are available, and attention may be imperfect.
We study the competition between alternatives that want to be chosen by an imperfectly
attentive chooser and select their own salience, namely the factors that lead to being noticed.
This structure broadly fits several economic, political and social situations, as exemplified
further below.
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If a chooser suffers from cognitive imperfections he will not always pick the best alterna-
tive. Even so, for some leading models of choice with errors the probability (or frequency)
of choice of an alternative can still be used as an indicator of its quality. For instance, in the
popular multinomial logit (or Luce) model, where the true value of an alternative is imper-
fectly perceived, the resulting probabilities of choice are proportional to utility values.1 But
if instead the source of errors is the imperfect attention paid to alternatives with a given
salience, this proportionality might not hold.2 The most chosen alternatives may simply be
the most salient, not the best ones.
What happens when alternatives can set their own salience? Do strategic forces tend
to correct choice errors caused by lack of attention? To answer these questions, we present
a model of strategic salience that abstracts as much as possible from the specific nature of
the alternatives. These could be politicians, producers, sexual partners, and so on. In this
way, while we lose the details that colour any specific application, we are able to tease out
some general relationships and mechanisms. Broadly speaking, we find that the key to the
equilibrium relationship between quality and salience is the type of externalities that own
salience has on the visibility of the other alternatives: positive externalities (in a sense to
be made precise later) push in favour of the best alternative being also the most salient and
the most chosen.
We use the concept of a consideration set (Wright and Barbour 1977, Eliaz and Spiegler,
2011a, 2011b; Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay 2012; Manzini and Mariotti 2014) as a tool
to model agents with an imperfect ability or willingness to consider all the objects of choice
1The logit model is equivalent to the maximisation of a utility perturbed with i.i.d. Gumbel distributed
utility errors, a classical result due to Holman and Marley, as attributed in Luce and Suppes (1965), Mc-
Fadden (1974) and Yellot (1977).
2See e.g. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) and Brady and Rhebeck (2014).
2
that are physically available.3 In these models, an agent’s preference is only maximised on
the subset of alternatives in the menu that the agent actively considers, or pays attention
to, not necessarily on the whole menu. While obviously the consideration set is a theoret-
ical construct that is not directly observable, there is evidence of situations in which the
consideration set is strictly smaller than the menu (e.g. Sovinsky Goeree 2008 documents
that purchasers of personal computers are typically not aware of all available models when
making a choice).4
That alternatives can influence the consideration set of the chooser is natural in disparate
contexts. A minor politician can make an outrageous statement to get noticed by the media
and thus enter the voters’ consideration set, but he will likely incur a cost in terms of
credibility. A new product is offered at a discount in its early days. A single person in search
of a partner can increase expenditure on hairdressing to get noticed. He may or may not
like hairdressing: importantly, both situations will be captured in our model.
These examples also serve to illustrate a focal special case. If the aim of e.g. a political
or promotional campaign is merely to generate awareness of say a candidate, outlet or
brand (rather than to influence tastes) then it is natural to assume that awareness of one
alternative is largely unaffected by the advertising campaigns for, and the awareness of,
rival alternatives. Notably, this is a feature of Butters’ (1977) classical ‘mailbox’ model of
informative advertising, in which a consumer is informed of a’s existence if a has dropped
3See also Roberts and Lattin (1997) and Shocker et al. (1991).
4The failure to seriously consider all alternatives may in fact stem from several sources. It could, for
example, be the outcome of a search process, or of ideological prejudice (e.g. Wilson 2008). While in the
paper we focus for simplicity on the attention interpretation, the possibility of other interpretations should
be borne in mind.
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an ad in the agent’s mailbox.5 The empirical study by van Nierop et al. (2010) does suggest
that the probability of being noticed is independent across alternatives.
Assume that while salience is endogenous, the quality of an alternative (its position in the
preference ranking of the chooser) is fixed. In this setting, competition for attention between
alternatives gives rise to an interesting strategic situation, which we call an attention game.
Attention games can have a rich externality structure (unlike e.g. the superficially similar
contest games; see section 5 for details), which we exploit in our results.
Proposition 1 shows that if there are no externalities, in the sense that alternatives can
fully control the attention they get (though obviously not the probability with which they
are chosen), then ‘the showier is the better’: once asymmetries in the technology of salience
are netted out, it can never happen that an alternative is strictly more salient in equilibrium
than a better alternative. Therefore, because whenever two alternatives are both noticed the
inferior one cannot be chosen (recall that the chooser maximises within the consideration
set), alternatives of better quality are chosen more often that all those of lower quality. The
better and showier is also the more chosen.
In some respects this result holds under quite general conditions. For example, a remark-
able fact is that virtually no restrictions are needed on the strategy sets and on the cost
structure of salience.6 Indeed, it is not necessary to assume that increasing salience requires
spending additional resources: the result goes through when generating salience is a costless
or even rewarding activity (this is another fundamental difference between attention games
and contest games), or when there is a mixture of these cases.
Part of this conclusion can be generalised to a larger class of games that have positive ex-
5Butters’ model is discussed more fully in section 5.
6So in particular the result holds for any game, with finite or infinite strategy sets, for which standard
existence results apply.
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ternalities, in the sense that a weak supermodularity condition on the technology of salience
is satisfied, and that alternatives do not damage the visibility of other alternatives by in-
creasing own salience (Proposition 2). A shouting competition to get attention in a market
is an example of a situation with negative externalities, while Butters’ (1977) model is an
example with no externalities, and an industry in which a firm attracting attention to itself
also attracts attention to the whole industry is an example of positive externalities.7
When alternatives lack full control on the attention they get and there may be harmful
spillovers by rivals, no clear link between equilibrium salience and quality seem to exist. In
this case salience may confound the quality ranking (Claim 1), but we also show that with
a standard ‘Luce’ technology a the-best-is-the-showiest result is reinstated (Claim 2).
A different route to inferior alternatives being chosen with the highest probability is when
salience is not a directional phenomenon but rather is contextual, in the sense that visibility
depends on the alternative’s location in a space of characteristics in relation to the location
of other alternatives - e.g. dressing in white when the others dress in black (Claim 3).
After introducing attention games (section 1) we present the main results in section
2. Section 3 describes situations with negative externalities, and section 4 situations of
contextual salience. Section 5 discusses some related literature. Section 6 summarises and
contains additional discussion and reference to the literature.
7An interesting example of positive externalities (in our sense) is provided by the idea in de Clippel, Eliaz
and Rozen (2014): a market leader’s high salience might induce otherwise passive (inattentive) consumers
to give closer scrutiny to the market as a whole. (Note that in their model this is not such good news, for
there firms dislike attention!).
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1 Attention games
Alternatives in a finite set A = {a1, ..., an} wish to be chosen by a chooser with imperfect
attention. The chooser evaluates alternatives by means of a strict preference ordering  on
A. The position of an alternative in the ranking is its quality, with ai  aj iff i < j.
The chooser maximises  on a consideration set C (A) ⊆ A of alternatives (the set of
alternatives the chooser actively considers), which is formed stochastically in the manner
explained below. When C (A) is empty, the chooser is assumed to pick a default alternative
a∗ (e.g. walking away from the shop, remaining without a partner, abstaining from voting).
The probability that an alternative ai belongs to C (A) depends on a set of variables
σj ∈ R, j = 1, ..., n, one for each alternative. These variables indicate the ability of each
alternative to attract attention (and possibly to dampen or increase the attention paid to
the other alternatives). The strategy set for each ai is a subset S ⊂ R. Unless otherwise
specified, we need not assume any additional structure on S. We call σi ∈ S the salience
of ai, and a list σ = (σ1, ..., σn) ∈ Sn a salience profile. As usual we write σ−i to denote
the profile σ with the ith entry omitted, (σ1, ..., σi−1, σi+1, ..., σn), and (σi, σ−i) to denote σ.
Given two vectors v, v′ ∈ Rk, k ≤ n,we write v ≥ v′ to signify vi ≥ v′i for all i = 1, ..., k.
The technology of salience is described by functions pi : S
n → (0, 1), i = 1, .., n. Each pi
associates a salience profile with the probability of membership of C (A) for ai: that is, pi (σ)
is the probability that ai is noticed when the salience profile is σ. We assume that these
probabilities are interior, namely there is always an (arbitrarily small) positive probability of
being noticed or of not being noticed, independently of salience. The only further assumption
we make for the moment on the functions pi is the following:
Own Monotonicity: For all i, for all σ ∈ Sn: σi > σ′i ⇒ pi (σi, σ−i) > pi (σ′i, σ−i).
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Own Monotonicity stipulates that increasing one’s own salience strictly increases the
probability of being noticed, whatever the salience of the other alternatives. An example of
this type of function, which we will consider later in sections 3 and 5, takes the Luce form
pi (σ) =
σi
σ1 + ...+ σn
(1)
with the σis chosen on a strictly positive domain.
8 In this example, an increase in salience
of an alternative is harmful to its competitors. While this is natural in some contexts, the
opposite effect may occur in others. For instance, an alternative ai which is similar to,
or dominated by, another alternative aj may make the latter more prominent, so that an
increase in the salience of ai also increases aj’s visibility (the probability of it getting noticed).
These possibilities are well known and documented in marketing science and psychology as
the ‘similarity’ and ‘attraction’ effects.
The chooser picks the preferred alternative among those he considers. Therefore, the
probability ρi (σ) that alternative ai is chosen at a salience profile σ is the probability of the
compound event that it is considered and that none of the better alternatives is considered,
that is
ρi (σ) = pi (σ)
∏
k<i
(1− pk (σ))
The payoff to each alternative is the probability of being chosen minus a (possibly neg-
ative) cost associated with the salience level that has been selected. An interpretation of
this payoff function is that alternatives vie for one single chooser who chooses one alterna-
tive, yielding a unit payoff. Another interpretation is that alternatives face a continuum of
identical choosers each of whom picks one alternative (the latter interpretation is adopted
in Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011 as well as in Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2014).
8We call this the Luce form in view of the Luce (1959) stochastic choice rule, popular in econometrics in
the multinomial logit version.
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The payoff to alternative ai for a pure strategy profile σ is
pii (σ) = ρi (σ)− ei (σi)
where ei : S → R. We make no further assumption on the functions ei. In particular,
ei may be convex or concave or neither, and may not be monotonic increasing. So ei can
represent both costly effort (for example an advertising budget) and elation, when increasing
salience is pleasurable at least on some range (for example, hairdressing to become salient
in competition for sexual partners).
An attention game is denoted (A, S, pi), where pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) with the pii defined
above and satisfying Own Monotonicity.
An attention game has absolute salience if it satisfies the following condition:
Absolute Salience: for all σ, σ′and for all i: σi = σ′i ⇒ pi (σ) = pi (σ′)
That is, an attention game with absolute salience is one in which an alternative can
decide its own probability of being noticed independently of the salience choices by the other
alternatives. Of course, even in this case the strategic situation is not trivial: the payoff of an
alternative typically still depends on the salience profile, since it depends on the probability
of being chosen which in turns is determined (for all alternatives except the best) by the
salience profile. As noted before, the situation captured by absolute salience fits for example
the case of when ads for an alternative merely have the function of making the chooser
actively aware of the alternative (‘did you know that people who read book A also read book
B?’; ‘have you considered cycling to work’?). When salience is not absolute it is relative.
We study the pure strategy Nash equilibria of attention games.
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2 Does salience reveal quality?
Obviously an alternative that has access to a superior salience technology might produce
more salience in equilibrium. The interesting issue is what the intrinsic strategic incentives
to become salient are in an attention game once we strip out such technological asymmetries.
We exhibit environments where, when alternatives are ex-ante symmetric except for the
difference in quality (they have access to the same technology of salience), the best alternative
is guaranteed to have a highest salience level in equilibrium. In some of these environment,
the stronger property holds that the equilibrium salience order (weakly) correlates with
the quality order. In this case, a strictly higher salience is always (not just for the best
alternative) diagnostic of strictly higher quality.
An attention game is symmetric when the following holds:
Symmetry:
(i) For all i, j and all x, y ∈ S:
pi (σ1, ..., σi−1, x, σi+1, ..., σj−1, y, σj+1, ..., σn) = pj (σ1, ..., σi−1, y, σi+1, ..., σj−1, x, σj+1, ..., σn)
(ii) For all i: ei = e for some e : S → R.
The first part of Symmetry says that the effectiveness of salience for getting noticed for a
given configuration of the other alternatives’ salience is the same for each alternative. More
precisely, holding the salience of all alternatives fixed except for ai and aj, the attention
attracted by ai with a level of salience x when aj has salience y is the same as the attention
attracted by aj with salience x when ai has salience y. The second part of the condition
simply says that achieving any level of salience has the same payoff implications for any two
alternatives.
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Remarkably, the main characterisation results below require no restriction on the struc-
ture of the strategy sets S, nor on that of the cost function e.
The reason for this generality is that the argument boils down to a revealed preference
one: the proof shows that if it was profitable for one alternative to raise its level of salience
from a given level, given the cost, then it would be profitable in the same situation to do so
for any better alternative. Because the cost function is common and because of the absolute
salience and symmetry assumptions, the ’world’ looks the same from the perspectives of two
different alternatives, except for the structure of the benefits: the better alternative has a
higher benefit from raising salience than an inferior alternative because there are more events
in which it is chosen conditionally on being noticed. So the better alternative has overall a
stronger incentive to invest in salience.
Proposition 1. (The showier is the better) Let G be a symmetric attention game with
absolute salience. Let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium of G. Then, σi > σj ⇒ j > i.
Proof: We use a revealed preference argument. By contradiction, suppose that for some i, j
with i < j we had σj > σi. Since σj is optimal for j at σ, it must be in particular:
pij (σ) ≥ pij (σi, σ−j)
⇔ pj (σ)
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))− e (σj) ≥ pj (σi, σ−j)
∏
k<j
(1− pk(σ1, ..., σj−1, σi, σj+1, ..., σn))− e (σi)
(where we have used Symmetry (ii)). Because the game has absolute salience we have
pk(σ1, ..., σj−1, σi, σj+1, ..., σn) = pk (σ)
and so the above inequality implies:
(pj (σ)− pj (σi, σ−j))
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ)) ≥ e (σj)− e (σi) .
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Similarly, from the optimality of σi we obtain:
(pi (σj, σ−i)− pi (σ))
∏
k<i
(1− pk (σ)) ≤ e (σj)− e (σi) .
By absolute salience,
pj (σi, σ−j) = pj (σ1, ..., σi−1, σj, σi+1, ..., σj−1, σi, σj+1, ..., σn)
and then by Symmetry (i) pj (σi, σ−j) = pi (σ). Similarly, we have pj (σ) = pi (σj, σ−i).
Moreover, by Own Monotonicity and σj > σi, pi (σj, σ−i) − pi (σ) > 0. It follows that the
above inequalities imply ∏
k<i
(1− pk (σ)) ≤
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))
which is impossible given the range assumption on the pk.
So, for games of absolute salience, there is a (weak) correlation between equilibrium
salience and quality ranking: not only is the best alternative one of those with the high-
est salience, but also a higher quality implies a higher salience at any level of the quality
hierarchy. Observe that the result can still obtain even when salience is attainable for free:
Example 1. Consider a simple scenario with two alternatives, a1 and a2, and two possible
strategies, high and low, in a symmetric attention game, with ei (h) = 0 = ei (l) for i = 1, 2.
Let p be as in the Table ??, where each column corresponds to a different strategy profile, and
where α, β, γ and δ are real numbers satisfying α > γ and β > δ (by Own Monotonicity).
Corresponding payoffs are displayed on the right.
If Absolute Salience holds (the environment of Proposition 1) we also have α = β and
γ = δ, so that h is strictly dominant for both alternatives. However if we drop Absolute
Salience, then while h is still dominant for a1, this will also be the case for a2 if and only if
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hh hl lh ll
p1 (σ) α β γ δ
p2 (σ) α γ β δ
l h
l δ,δ (1− δ) γ,β (1− γ)
h β,γ (1− β) α, α (1− α)
Table 1: The functions p1 (left) and corresponding payoffs (right) in Example 1
β > 1− α(1−α)
γ
. Thus in the opposite case even if salience is free we can support (h, l) as an
equilibrium outcome.
The the-best-is-the-showiest feature of this result (but not the general weak correlation
between quality and salience) is preserved if we weaken absolute salience to “positive exter-
nalities”, as expressed by the following conditions:
Weak Supermodularity: For all i, all σ−i, σ′−i ∈ Sn−1 with σ′−i ≥ σ−i, and all x, y ∈ S
with x > y:
pi
(
x, σ′−i
)− pi (y, σ′−i) ≥ pi (x, σ−i)− pi (y, σ−i)
Cross Monotonicity: For all i, all σ−i, σ′−i ∈ Sn−1 with σ′−i ≥ σ−i, pi
(
σi, σ
′
−i
) ≥
pi (σi, σ−i).
Both conditions impose positive spillovers of own salience on the rivals, with Weak Su-
permodularity acting on the first differences of the pis and Cross Monotonicity acting on the
absolute levels.
Cross Monotonicity says that an alternative cannot harm the visibility of the rivals by
raising its own salience. This is verified in games of absolute salience. Another situation
captured by the property is when advertising by an individual (e.g. a firm selling a new type
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of product) draws attention to similar individuals (the firms selling similar products) and
hence to the whole group (industry).9
Weak Supermodularity says that the effectiveness for getting noticed of an increase in an
alternative’s own salience increases with the salience of the other alternatives. Note that this
is a condition on the function pi only: the whole payoff function need not be supermodular even
when Weak Supermodularity is satisfied. If salience is absolute then Weak Supermodularity
is trivially satisfied. The condition might also be verified in the similarity within an industry
example given above: the salience effort of an individual firm in a little known industry is
likely to be less effective than when other firms selling similar products are well-known.10
Proposition 2. (The best is the showiest). Let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium of a
symmetric attention game which satisfies Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity.
Then σ1 ≥ σj for all j > 1.
Proof : Suppose by contradiction that σj > σ1 for some j > 1. The optimality condition for
9Payro´ and U¨lku¨ (2015) study this kind of similarity-based mistakes in a choice theoretic context.
10It may be interesting to think of ‘mirror’ axioms in which a competitor’s salience generates negative
spillovers, i.e. Weak Submodularity and Decreasing Cross Monotonicity. They would imply that given i’s
chosen salience, alternative j could reduce the probability that i is noticed by increasing her own salience
(for Decreasing Cross Monotonicity), and/or that any change in own salience would be less effective the
higher the salience chosen by others (for Weak Submodularity). The latter might capture a ‘trading floor
situation’: increasing own visibility is more difficult if everyone is already wearing garish colours/shouting
very loudly. The former might apply in ‘comparative campaign’ types of situations, in which each alternative
increases own salience by underlying how better than an opponent they have done. A full treatment of
negative externalities is non-trivial and it is beyond the scope of this paper - however we hint at some of the
consequences of negative externalities and relative salience in sections 3 and 4.
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aj at σ implies in particular:
pj (σ)
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))−ej (σj) ≥ pj (σ1, σ−j)
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ1, ..., σj−1, σ1, σj+1, ..., σn))− ej (σ1)
By Cross Monotonicity and σ1 < σj we have
pk (σ) ≥ pk (σ1, ..., σj−1, σ1, σj+1, ..., σn) for all k 6= j
⇒
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ1, ..., σj−1, σ1, σj+1, ..., σn)) ≥
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))
and therefore
pj (σ)
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))− ej (σj) ≥ pj (σ1, σ−j)
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ))− ej (σ1)
or
(pj (σ)− pj (σ1, σ−j))
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ)) ≥ ej (σj)− ej (σ1) (2)
To avoid cumbersome notation, denote, for x, y ∈ S,
(y, x, σ−1j) = (y, σ2, ..., σj−1, x, σj+1, .., σn)
the profile in which a1 plays y, aj plays x and all other alternatives play as in σ. By Weak
Supermodularity (2) implies
(pj (σj, σj, σ−1j)− pj (σj, σ1, σ−1j))
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ)) ≥ ej (σj)− ej (σ1) .
Then, by Symmetry
(p1 (σj, σj, σ−1j)− p1 (σ1, σj, σ−1j))
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ)) ≥ e (σj)− e (σ1)
or
(p1 (σj, σ−1)− p1 (σ))
∏
k<j
(1− pk (σ)) ≥ e (σj)− e (σ1)
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Since σ1 < σj, by Own Monotonicity we have p1 (σj, σj, σ−1j)− p1 (σ1, σj, σ−1j) > 0, and
by the range assumption on the pk we have 1 >
∏
k<j (1− pk (σ)) > 0. We conclude that
(p1 (σj, σ−1)− p1 (σ)) > e (σj)− e (σ1) .
But this means that a1 would improve by deviating from σ1 to σj at profile σ, a contra-
diction.
Note that the the-best-is-the-showiest result is unrelated to any kind of signalling argu-
ment. There is no hidden quality to signal to the chooser via costly investment. The reason
why lower quality alternatives never produce more salience in equilibrium does not derive
either from lower levels of resources or lower unit costs of salience production, both types of
asymmetry having been ruled out: every alternative can choose from exactly the same set
at exactly the same cost or benefit. The result is purely a function of the cognitive process
postulated for the chooser.
Why do the conditions on pi turn out to be important for the result? Let’s focus on the
incentives to raise own salience. On the one hand, increasing own salience attracts attention
to oneself. But - depending on the pis - there may also be a second effect: that of detracting
attention from other alternatives. This second part of the incentive is always stronger for
lower quality alternatives. Good alternatives “do not care” whether worse alternatives are
noticed or not - their payoff only depends on the probability that even better alternatives
are noticed. In the extreme case, the best alternative only cares about its own probability
of getting noticed, so that the only incentive it has is of the first type. Thus if the pis are
decreasing in the salience of other alternatives, an increase in own salience tends to be the
more profitable the lower the quality of an alternative. Cross Monotonicity removes this
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tendency. Assume now that a worse alternative w finds it profitable to raise salience from l
to h > l while a better alternative b chooses l. Can this be an equilibrium? Suppose that b is
the only other alternative beside w. Note that b’s gain in visibility when moving from l to h
would be scaled up compared to that of w, by a factor strictly greater than one, given by the
(reciprocal of the) probability that b is not noticed: only if b is not noticed, in fact, will w be
picked if noticed. So the only reason why b might not want to follow w in raising salience to
h is that raising own salience becomes less effective for becoming more noticeable when the
rivals raise their salience, which w has done. Weak supermodularity eliminates precisely this
effect. So if it were profitable for the worse alternative w to raise salience to h, it would be
a fortiori profitable for the better alternative b, and therefore the initial configuration could
not be an equilibrium.
However, the above reasoning might not hold in the presence of a third alternative t
that is even better than b, and b’s possible increase in salience was beneficial to t while w’s
increase in salience was not. In this case, b might prefer to keep its salience low in order not
to draw attention to t, while w would not face this negative incentive. It is for this reason
that, once we move beyond games of absolute salience and allow for positive externalities,
only the top alternative is sure to produce more salience in equilibrium: the peculiarity of
the top alternative is that it is the only one that does not need to worry about the effect
of its own salience on the attention paid to the other alternatives. In this sense there is a
difference between the way in which the top alternative is better than the second best and
that in which the second best is better than the third best. The next example illustrates
this fact in a three-player attention game satisfying all the conditions of Proposition 2 and
in which the second best alternative is less salient in equilibrium than the third best one.
Example 2. Let σi ∈ {l, h} with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and h > l. There is a common effort function
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e with e (l) = 0 and e (h) = 3
32
. Let pi (σ) be given by the following table:
hhh hhl hlh hll lhh lhl llh lll
p1 (σ)
3
4
5
8
5
8
5
8
1
4
1
8
1
8
1
8
p2 (σ)
3
4
5
8
1
4
1
8
5
8
5
8
1
8
1
8
p3 (σ)
3
4
1
4
5
8
1
8
5
8
1
8
5
8
1
8
Table 2: The functions pi in Example 2
The profile σ = (h, l, h) is an equilibrium, since we have:
ρ1 (h, l, h) =
17
32
≥ 1
8
= ρ1 (l, l, h)
ρ2 (h, l, h) =
3
32
≥ 3
32
= ρ2 (h, h, h)
ρ3 (h, l, h) =
21
256
≥ 21
512
= ρ3 (h, l, l)
It is easy to check that Weak Supermodularity and Cross-Monotonicity hold (details available
from the authors).
Note in Example 2 that
p1 (h, l, h)− p1 (h, l, l) = 5
8
− 5
8
<
3
4
− 5
8
= p1 (h, h, h)− p1 (h, l, h)
This means that when the worst alternative a3 increases its own salience from l to h there is
no spillover on the visibility of the best alternative a1; but the same increase at (h, l, h) on
the part of the middling alternative a2 would have a positive externality on a1. This deters
a2 from raising its own salience up to the level of a1.
Observe in passing how effects such as those just discussed make clear the stark difference
between All Pay Contests and attention games, to which they might at first sight seem to bear
some similarity: in an auction, an increase in one’s own bid can only be weakly detrimental
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for a rival. Attention games have a richer externality structure. We expand on this point in
section 5.
Example 2 also shows that the statements of the propositions cannot be strengthened to
obtain a strict correlation between salience and quality. The the-best-is-the-showiest prop-
erty ensures that if there is an alternative that is uniquely maximally salient in equilibrium,
then that alternative must also be the best one; but it does not exclude that alternatives of
lower quality tie with the best for salience. However, even if we have to settle for a weak
correlation, an immediate but important implication of Proposition 2 is:
Corollary 1. (The best gets picked most often) Let σ be a pure strategy equilibrium
of a symmetric attention game satisfying Weak Supermodularity and Cross Monotonicity.
Then alternatives of higher quality are chosen with strictly greater probability: 1 < j ⇒
ρ1 (σ) > ρj (σ).
Corollary 1 can be read from a revealed preference perspective. Suppose that neither
the salience of alternatives nor the chooser’s preferences are observable to an outside party,
but that this party knows the structure of the game. Then, Corollary 1 implies that the
observer could still infer the identity of the best alternative from choice data - provided it
suffers no technological disadvantage. However the choice frequencies of other alternatives
might not faithfully reveal their quality ranking: quality is revealed by choice only for the
top alternative.
A second perspective from which Corollary 1 can be read is as showing circumstances in
which competitive forces counterbalance the cognitive limitations of the chooser. Competi-
tion pushes the best alternatives to raise their salience sufficiently to overcome the distorsive
effects of imperfect attention on the relative popularity of the alternatives.
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3 Negative externalities: examples with the Luce form
When salience is relative, and Weak Supermodularity or Cross Monotonicity fail, the neat
equilibrium properties obtained in the previous section may break down. Perverse equilibria
become possible, in which the worst alternative is selected with the strictly highest probabil-
ity (‘perverse’ is meant in contrast to the situation that holds for standard models of choice
errors, such as the logit).
Claim 1. There are attention games of relative salience with equilibria in which the worst
alternative is chosen with the strictly highest probability.
This claim is shown with a two-alternative example in which S = {l, h} with h > l and
the probability of being noticed has the Luce form (1):
pi (σ) =
σi
σi + σj
for i 6= j. We impose the following restrictions on the admissible values of h and l:
h >
9
32
> l > 0
h+ l >
1
2
h ∈
[
3
8
− l − 1
8
√
9− 32l, 3
8
− l + 1
8
√
9− 32l
]
Let ei (x) = x for i = 1, 2 and x ∈ {h, l}, so we drop the subscript. Then the profile σ = (l, h)
in which the showiest is the strictly worst is a strict Nash equilibrium for all admissible values
of l and h. Not all admissible profiles of this type also have the property that alternative a2
is picked with higher probability. Such profiles do exist, however (the simple calculation is
available from the authors upon request).
However, at least limited forms of the the-best-is-the-showiest property also hold in some
“natural” attention games despite them failing both Weak Supermodularity and Cross Mono-
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tonicity. We illustrate the point with another Luce form example in which alternatives can
choose any positive level of salience. Even in the two player case, whether or not the super-
modularity condition pi
(
x, σ′j
)− pi (y, σ′j) ≥ pi (x, σj)− pi (y, σj) holds depends on the sign
of σ′jσj−xy. Moreover, any alternative’s increase in own salience is detrimental to the rivals’
chances of being noticed. Nevertheless, we show that the the-best-is-the-showiest result fully
applies in the two-alternative case, or to the two best alternatives in any game with n > 2.
Claim 2. Let G = (A, S, pi) be a symmetric attention game with S = R++; pi (σ) = σiσ1+...+σn
for all i, all σ; and with e twice differentiable and weakly convex. Then at any equilibrium σ
of G the salience chosen by the best alternative is never lower than that chosen by the second
best alternative; that is, σ1 ≥ σ2.
Proof : Denote k = σ3 + ...+ σn ≥ 0. At any interior equilibrium the FOCs for alternatives
1 and 2 must be satisfied
∂
(
σ1
σ1+σ2+k
)
∂σ1
= e′ (σ1)
∂
(
σ2
σ1+σ2+k
σ2+k
σ1+σ2+k
)
∂σ2
= e′ (σ2)
where e′ denotes the first derivative of e. Dividing side by side the two equations and
simplifying we get
(k + σ2)
k + σ1 + σ2
kσ1 + kσ2 + 2σ1σ2 + k2
=
e′ (σ1)
e′ (σ2)
(3)
Suppose by contradiction that σ2 > σ1. Then, by the weak convexity of e,
e′(σ1)
e′(σ2)
≤ 1. It
follows from (3) that
(k + σ2)
k + σ1 + σ2
kσ1 + kσ2 + 2σ1σ2 + k2
≤ 1⇔ σ1 ≥ σ2 + k
a contradiction in view of k ≥ 0.
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The examples in this section suggests that, at least with the Luce form, the possibility
of perverse equilibria is related to restrictions in the strategy spaces of the players. When
these spaces are sufficiently rich, as shown in Claim 2 the better alternative will always find
it profitable to deviate from a profile at which the inferior alternative is more salient. This
sensitivity to the domain somehow dampens hopes of finding a nice general condition that
is necessary as well as sufficient for a the-best-is-the-showiest result to hold, which remains
an open problem.
4 Contextual salience
There is a different way in which the the-best-is-the-showiest property may collapse. So far
we have assumed (through Own Monotonicity) that salience, whether absolute or relative, is
a ‘directional’ attribute for which ‘the more is always the better’: the more commercials you
produce, the louder you shout, the glitzier your clothes, the more likely - ceteris paribus - you
are to get noticed. In some scenarios, however, alternatives can only control variables whose
values are not intrinsically positive or negative for the aim of attracting attention; whether
they are depends, for each alternative, on what the other alternatives do. If everybody
else dresses in green you will be salient by dressing in yellow, and viceversa. If all other
candidates converge on a given political message, you will stand out by deviating from that
message. We call this scenario one of contextual salience.
We study a simple stylised class of models of contextual salience that generates the
perverse result. Suppose that σi ∈ [0, 1] is now a ‘position’ selected by alternative ai in the
unit interval. Whether or not the probability that ai is noticed is increasing in σi depends
on the entire profile σ: that is, Own Monotonicity may fail. In particular, we assume that
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an alternative’s probability of being noticed is conferred by its distance from the ‘average
alternative’ (excluding itself):
pi (σ) = αi
(
vi −
∑
j 6=i vj
(n− 1)
)2
∈ [0, 1]
where αi ∈ (0, 1) for all i can be seen for instance as a psychological parameter indicating
how naturally inclined the chooser is to notice any given alternative. Finally assume for
simplicity a null effort-elation function so that we can take
pii (σ) = pi (σ)
∏
k<i
(1− pk (σ))
Claim 3. There exist (for some values n and α1, ..., αn) pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
game above in which the worst alternative is chosen with the highest probability.11
The case of contextual salience we have studied has some superficial similarity with
location games a` la Hotelling. In that case, too, alternatives can gain by moving away from
the nearest neighbour. However, the payoff structure is in fact very different. This results,
unlike a location game, in an existence result with three players, as detailed in the proof of
Claim 3.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. Consider a situation with three alter-
natives, in which the two better alternatives a1 and a2 are conformist, while a3 is non-
conformist: in particular, a1 and a2 bunch at one extreme position, whereas a3 occupies a
solitary position at the other extreme. Then, for players a1 and a2, the average position of
the other players is 1
2
. Alternative a1 cares only about its own probability of being noticed,
and because of the convexity of the pi functions this is maximal at maximum distance from
the average position 1
2
, that is at the extremes: so, a1 cannot gain by deviating. Alternative
11The proof is relegated to an Online Appendix.
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a2’s probability of being noticed responds exactly like that of a1 to changes in own position,
but its probability of being chosen also depends (negatively) on a1’s probability of being
noticed. By moving away from position 0, a2 makes a1 more noticeable, and therefore a2
does not gain by deviating either. As for a3, by locating as far away as possible from the rest,
it maximises its own probability of being noticed. Of course this also makes the opponents
more noticeable, but it is not difficult to find parameter configurations for which the benefits
outweigh the costs. This shows that the configuration of positions is a Nash equilibrium,
which, for appropriate choices of parameters, has the feature that the worst alternative is
chosen with the highest probability.
5 Related literature
The literature that deals with various aspects of attention is getting extensive - here we
focus only on a subset of works that is most closely related to ours. For studies of attention
within a consideration set (where attention is selectively applied to specific features of the
alternatives), see for example the recent approach in Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2014)
and the works cited therein. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a and 2011b, henceforth ES) study the
strategic aspects of the competition between firms to make products (or the firm’s brand
name as a whole) enter the consideration sets of consumers. Beside the broad conceptual
relation, the focus of the analysis there is quite different from ours. The heart of the ES
models is the mechanism of attracting attention via the choice of offered product menus
(or more in general, of marketing strategies) on the part of firms. Firms deploy marketing
strategies devoted to attention grabbing, and one main result of the analysis is that in
equilibrium firms will include pure attention grabbers in the menu. Our emphasis has been
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rather on the relationship between (exogenous) quality on the one hand, and equilibrium
salience and its effectiveness (the probability of being chosen) on the other. In order to
pose and answer the questions of this paper we need to be able to talk about the degree of
salience and the probability of being chosen. These variables are not identifiable as part of the
elements of the ES models. Precisely because marketing strategies are more complex objects
in ES than in this paper, there is no notion of marketing ‘intensity’ equivalent to our notion
of salience. Moreover, the choice model and the description of the chooser’s psychology
at the heart of the ES’ work is different from ours, and related to the one axiomatised in
an abstract context by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012) using revealed preference
techniques. In these models choice is deterministic rather than stochastic. In ES an attention
function determines whether other products are paid attention to, depending on a default
set of products, but not how much attention is paid to any object. Our device of stochastic
attention is the key for obtaining a more nuanced ranking of salience effectiveness. Stochastic
choice in a consideration set model has been axiomatised in Manzini and Mariotti (2014):
from this perspective, the present work offers a mechanism to endogenise, as equilibrium
values, the salience parameters of our previous work.
There is of course a vast literature specific to advertising competition in retail markets,
and some forms of informative advertising can be interpreted as placing a product in the
consideration set. Our model is more stylised than the models in this literature (we refer the
reader to Bagwell, 2007 for an extensive survey), where the issue of ‘attracting attention’
is intertwined with that of pricing strategies and other features of the market, and where
different questions from the ones we have posed are addressed. We illustrate this with the
advertising model which is conceptually the closest, namely Butters (1977). In this model,
there are many sellers and buyers. Producers of a homogeneous good can pay a fixed cost
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to inform a random number of buyers of their price and location. If a (potential) buyer is
not informed, he cannot buy the product: in this sense, Butters’ can be seen as a model
based on consideration sets. The focus is the limit equilibrium price distribution (as the
number of buyers and sellers grows to infinity). A first major difference between Butters’
and our analysis is that the latter, but not the former, fits situations where there is only a
single chooser: this is because the probability of noticing an alternative is a feature of the
psychology of the individual chooser, whereas the statistical attention effects in models a` la
Butters depend on a ‘mailbox’ model of information transmission, in which k out of n agents
are randomly informed. There is no information processing by an individual agent: if he
gets the ad in the mailbox he is informed, otherwise not. Aside from this, the relationship
between quality and salience, on which we have focused, cannot be studied in Butters’ model,
because what is being traded is a single homogeneous good for which all buyers have the same
willingness to pay (which in terms of our model can be interpreted as an assumption that
alternatives are not differentiated by quality). In a conceivable variation in which producers
sell products differentiated by quality, price would remain a key strategic variable: what this
class of models addresses is the trade-off between the price and the information variables,
whereas we have sought to study an equilibrium relationship between salience and quality
that holds also in environments in which prices are not relevant, such as political competition
(as noted by ES, who also eschew prices, this may apply even in some market contexts, such
as media markets).
While motivated very differently, it may be worth noting that attention games bear some
superficial structural similarity with (separable) ‘All-Pay Contests’ (henceforth APCs, see
Siegel, 2009 for a very general treatment). In a separable APC, the payoff function has the
form ui (σ) = Pi (σ)Vi−ci (σi), where σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is interpreted as a ‘score’ (e.g. lobbying
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intensity) profile, Pi is the probability of winning for player i at profile σ, Vi is the value of
the prize for i , and ci captures the (increasing) cost of a score. However, the ‘benefit’ part of
this expression does not include that of attention games, since in an APC Pi (σ) = 1 if i is one
of the m agents with the highest score, and Pi (σ) = 0 if it is not. In particular, increasing
one’s own score can only have negative spillovers on the rivals. Moreover, in attention games
the ei functions are essentially unrestricted, whereas it is a defining feature of APCs that
increases in the probability of winning come at a cost. So there is in fact almost no relation
between attention games and APC, and our results are independent of the existing results
in the theory of APCs.
Differential attention to alternatives is not necessarily tied to a consideration set inter-
pretation. One interesting example is the recent work by Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid
(2013) (henceforth EST), who study a Luce-type (Luce, 1959) model of stochastic choice in
which the perception of alternatives by the decision maker is hierarchical. An alternative
can only be chosen if the alternatives that precede it in a perception priority ranking is
(randomly) not chosen. Given that in our setting the set of alternatives is fixed, it turns out
that our model is also consistent with the EST interpretation. More precisely, in a slightly
simplified version of their choice model, the primitives are a utility function u : A→ R and
a perception ordering p.12 The probability that a ∈ A is chosen is
u (a)∑
b∈A u (b) + u (A)
 ∏
c∈A:cpa
(
1− u (c)∑
b∈A u (b) + u (A)
)
where u (A) is the (menu dependent) value of choosing some default option. Defining
µ (a,A) =
u (a)∑
b∈A u (b) + u (A)
12In the general version the perception ordering is a weak order, rather than a strict order, thus allowing
for “perception ties”.
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for all a ∈ A, this choice model falls within the class of choice models we are considering. To
see this, set =p and set σi = u (ai), so that pi (σ) = µ (ai, A). In this interpretation, we
assume that alternatives cannot change the perception ranking, just as in the consideration
set interpretation we assumed that they cannot change the quality ranking. However, they
can compete by striving to raise their quality (utility) and thus increase the probability of
being selected in the event that no alternative that is higher ranked in the perception ordering
is itself selected. Observe that µ (ai, A) is increasing in the utility of ai and decreasing in the
utility of the other alternatives, so that Own Monotonicity for an attention game is satisfied.
The model is not one of absolute salience, and it fails Weak Supermodularity. However, as
implied by Claim 2, in the two alternative version the the-best-is-the-showiest feature holds
under mild assumptions on the cost function.
6 Concluding remarks
While in many models of choice with errors (such as the logit) the choice frequency of an
alternative is an indicator of its quality, this is not necessarily the case when the source of
error is imperfect attention. We have shown however that, when salience is set through a
competitive process rather than being a given, there are plausible circumstances in which
the best is the showiest and the most chosen.
This result is especially interesting in light of some recent laboratory evidence suggesting
that, when strategic aspects are absent, there is a lack of correlation between alternatives’
quality and the probability of being noticed (Reutskaya et al., 2011, Krajbich and Rangel,
2011). In our previous work (2014) on individual decision making we also made no assump-
tion of correlation between quality and visibility. Our current result indicates that when
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strategic factors do operate, they might induce a sharp departure from this baseline. This
is particularly relevant in a context such as supermarket choice, which is the environment
that Reutskaya et al. (2011) replicate experimentally. This study supports the hypothesis
of our model that consumers optimise within the consideration set (called there the “seen
set”). However it also shows that consumers appear to search randomly with respect to
product quality. High quality products are not more likely to be considered. Because in real
supermarkets producers invest heavily to increase the salience of their products, it is hard
to assume that strategic forces do not operate, and thus our model suggests the possibility
that the lack of correlation observed in the experiment might not continue to hold in the
market, or that it may be due to yet unspecified countervailing factors.
More generally, we have highlighted several features of mechanisms for attracting atten-
tion. Roughly speaking we have identified the key variables at work as the existence and the
nature of externalities in the technology of salience. Increases in own salience may or may
not have spillovers on the attention grabbed by rivals. And such spillovers when they exist
may or may not be benign, that is, increasing own salience may (i) increase or decrease the
attention devoted to others, and (ii) increase or decrease the effectiveness of others’ salience
for getting noticed. It is only the situation with non-benign spillovers (in either of the two
senses (i) and (ii)) in which it may happen that the worst alternative strictly attracts the
most attention and is the most chosen. Otherwise, equilibrium forces always push the best
alternative to attain weakly more salience; its identity is revealed by the frequency of choice;
and if no externalities occur then frequencies of choice perfectly correlate with quality.
While endogenising salience, we have considered quality as a fixed characteristic of the al-
ternatives. Also, we have assumed that the chooser responds to salience in an unsophisticated
way, rather than actively thinking through the consequences of any information contained in
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the alternatives’ salience. Finally, we have ignored the issue of multiproduct firms, assuming
implicitly that each alternative corresponds to a single producer. These issues should be
addressed in future research.
University of St Andrews and IZA, Bonn
Queen Mary University of London
References
Bagwell, K. (2007) “The Economic Analysis of Advertising”, in Mark Armstrong & Robert
Porter (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3: 1701-1844.
Brady, R. and J. Rehbeck (2014) “Menu-Dependent Stochastic Feasibility”, Econometrica,
forthcoming
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli and A. Shleifer (2014) “Competition for Attention”, Review of
Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Butters, G.R. (1977) “Equilibrium Distribution of Sales and Advertising Prices”, The Re-
view of Economic Studies 44(3): 465-91.
de Clippel, G., K. Eliaz and K. Rozen (2014) “Competing for Consumer’s Inattention”,
Journal of Political Economy, 122 (6): 1203-34.
Echenique, F., K. Saito and Tserenjigmid (2013) “The Perception-Adjusted Luce Model”,
discussion paper, California Institute of Technology.
Eliaz, K. and R. Spiegler (2011a) “Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing”, Review
of Economic Studies 78: 235-262.
29
Eliaz, K. and R. Spiegler (2011b) “On the strategic use of attention grabbers”, Theoretical
Economics 6: 127–155.
Krajbich, I. and A. Rangel (2011) “Multialternative drift-diffusion model predicts the re-
lationship between visual fixations and choice in value-based decisions”, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13852-13857.
Luce, R.D. (1959) Individual Choice Behavior; a theoretical analysis. Wiley: New York.
Luce, R.D. and Suppes, P. (1965) “Preference, Utility, and Subjective Probability”. In R.D.
Luce, R.R. Bush, and E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. III,
pp. 235–06). New York: Wiley.
Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti (2014) ”Stochastic choice and consideration sets”, Economet-
rica 82 (3): 1153–1176.
Masatlioglu, Y., D. Nakajima and E. Ozbay (2012): “Revealed Attention”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 102(5): 2183-2205.
McFadden, D.L. (1974) “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior”, in P.
Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, 105-142, Academic Press: New York.
van Nierop, E., B. Bronnenberg, R. Paap, M. Wedel & P.H. Franses (2010) “Retrieving Un-
observed Consideration Sets from Household Panel Data”, Journal of Marketing Research
XLVII: 63–74.
Payro´, F. and L. U¨lku¨ (2015) “Similarity-based mistakes in choice”, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 61: 152-156.
30
Reutskaya, E., R. Nagel, C. F. Camerer, and A. Rangel (2011) “Search Dynamics in Con-
sumer Choice under Time Pressure: An Eye-Tracking Study”, The American Economic
Review, 101, 900-926.
Roberts, J. H. and J. M. Lattin (1997) “Consideration: Review of research and prospects
for future insights”, Journal of Marketing Research, 34(3): 406–410.
Siegel, R. (2009) “All-Pay Contests”, Econometrica 77(1): 71-92.
Shocker, A. D., M. Ben-Akiva, B. Boccara and P. Nedungadi (1991) “Consideration set
influences on consumer decision-making and choice: Issues, models, and suggestions”, Mar-
keting Letters, 2(3): 181–197.
Sovinsky Goeree, M. (2008) “Limited Information and Advertising in the US Personal
Computer Industry”, Econometrica 76: 1017-1074.
Wilson, C.J. (2008) “Consideration Sets and Political Choices: A Heterogeneous Model of
Vote Choice and Sub-national Party Strength”, Political Behavior 30:161–183.
Wright, P., and F. Barbour (1977) “Phased Decision Strategies: Sequels to an Initial Screen-
ing.” In: Studies in Management Sciences, Multiple Criteria Decision Making, ed. Martin
K. Starr, and Milan Zeleny, 91-109, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Yellot, J.I., JR. (1977) “The relationship between Luce’s choice axiom, Thurstone’s theory
of comparative judgment, and the double exponential distribution”, Journal of Mathemat-
ical Psychology, 15: 109-144.
31
Online Appendix: Proof of Claim 3
We consider the case of three alternatives and show that the position profile σ∗ = (0, 0, 1)
is a Nash Equilibrium with the desired property. For a generic profile σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3), the
choice probabilities are given by
pi1 (σ) =
(
σ1 − σ2+σ32
)2
α1
pi2 (σ) =
(
σ2 − σ1+σ32
)2
α2
(
1− (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )2 α1)
pi3 (σ) =
(
σ3 − σ1+σ22
)2
α3
(
1− (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )2 α1)(1− (σ2 − σ1+σ32 )2 α2)
so that
pi1 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4
α1
pi2 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4
α2
(
1− 1
4
α1
)
pi3 (0, 0, 1) = α3
(
1− 1
4
α1
) (
1− 1
4
α2
)
and thus
pi3 (σ
∗) > pi2 (σ∗) > pi1 (σ∗) (4)
for suitable values of αi, e.g. provided that α3 > min
{
α2
4−α2 ,
4α1
(4−α1)(4−α2)
}
∈ (0, 1). To check
that the above is an equilibrium, observe that first derivatives of the payoff functions with
respect to own salience are:
∂(pi1(σ))
∂σ1
= (2σ1 − (σ2 + σ3))α1
∂(pi2(σ))
∂σ2
= (2σ2 − (σ1 + σ3))α2
(
1− (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )2 α1)+ α1α2 (σ2 − σ1+σ32 )2 (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )
∂(pi3(σ))
∂σ3
= α3 (2σ3 − (σ1 + σ2))
(
1− (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )2 α1)(1− (σ2 − σ1+σ32 )2 α2)
+α1α3
(
σ3 − σ1+σ22
)2 (
σ1 − σ2+σ32
) (
1− (σ2 − σ1+σ32 )2 α2)
+α2α3
(
σ3 − σ1+σ22
)2 (
1− (σ1 − σ2+σ32 )2 α1) (σ2 − σ1+σ32 )
It is seen immediately that, with σ2+σ3
2
∈ [0, 1] being a minimum for pi1 (σ), alternative 1’s
best reply is a corner solution, i.e. either σ1 = 1 (if
σ2+σ3
2
≤ 1
2
) or σ1 = 0 (if
σ2+σ3
2
≥ 1
2
). In
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the candidate equilibrium σ2+σ3
2
= 1
2
, so that alternative 1 cannot improve on its payoff by
switching from σ1 = 0 to σ1 = 1. Turning now to alternative 2, we see that
∂ (pi2 (σ))
∂σ2
∣∣∣∣
σ1=0
σ3=1
=
1
8
α2 (2σ2 − 1)
(
8− 4α1σ22 − α1 − 5α1σ2
)
with three roots,13
r1 =
1
2
r2 =
1
8α1
(
−5α1 +
√
128α1 + 9α21
)
≥ r1
r3 = − 1
8α1
(
5α1 +
√
128α1 + 9α21
)
< 0
There are two candidate best replies14 at σ2 = 0 and σ2 = min {1, r2}. Letting α1 ∈
(
0, 4
5
)
ensures that σ2 = r2 is not a best reply.
15 The choice probabilities corresponding to the two
remaining candidate best replies are:
pi2 (0, 0, 1) =
1
4
α2
(
1− 1
4
α1
)
pi2 (0, 1, 1) =
1
4
α2 (1− α1) < 1
4
α2
(
1− 1
4
α1
)
so that, regardless of the size of α1 and α2, alternative 2 cannot profitably deviate from σ
∗.
Finally consider alternative 3:
∂pi3 (σ)
∂σ3
∣∣∣∣
σ1=0
σ2=0
=
1
8
α3σ3
(−8α1σ23 − 8α2σ23 + 3α1α2σ43 + 16)
13To check r2 ≥ r1 observe that
1
8α1
(
−5α1 +
√
128α1 + 9α21
)
≥ 1
2
⇔ 128
α172
≥ 1
which holds true always.
14This holds because ∂(pi2(σ))∂σ2
∣∣∣σ1=0
σ3=1
< 0 if σ2 ∈
[
0, 12
)
and ∂(pi2(σ))∂σ2
∣∣∣σ1=0
σ3=1
> 0 if σ2 ∈
(
1
2 ,min {1, r2}
]
.
15Observe that r2 > 1 if and only if α1 ∈
(
0, 45
)
.
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Of the three distinct roots of the polynomial,16 one is negative, one is larger than unity and
one is σ3 = 0, with
∂pi3(σ)
∂σ3
∣∣∣
σ1=0
σ2=0
> 0 for σ3 ∈ (0, 1). It follows that pi3 (0, 0, σ3) is maximised
for σ3 = 1, with corresponding choice probability
pi3 (σ
∗) = α3
(
1− 1
4
α1
)(
1− 1
4
α2
)
> 0 = pi3 (0, 0, 0)
Then σ∗ = (0, 0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium in which, provided that α1 ∈
(
0, 4
5
)
and α3 >
min
{
α2
4−α2 ,
4α1
(4−α1)(4−α2)
}
, condition (4) holds, so that the worst alternative has the highest
probability of being chosen
16The roots are 0 and ±1.154 7
√
1
α1α2
(
α1 + α2 −
√
α21 − α1α2 + α22
)
, where the non zero roots are double
roots.
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